Corporate social responsibility in a general equilibrium stock market model: Solving the financial performance puzzle by Dam, Lammertjan
CCSO Centre for Economic Research 
 









CCSO Working paper 2006/03 
 
 
Corporate social responsibility in a general equilibrium 





















CCSO Working Papers 
http://www.eco.rug.nl/ccso Corporate Social Responsibility in a General
Equilibrium Stock Market Model:
Solving the Financial Performance Puzzle
Lammertjan Dam∗
University of Groningen, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV
Groningen, The Netherlands
Abstract
We analyze corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a general equilibrium stock mar-
ket model with uncertainty in production. Production generates non-market costs
and consumers take this into account when they construct their portfolio. We de-
duce empirically testable hypotheses and analyze how CSR aﬀects various ﬁnancial
performance indicators. We show that our model oﬀers an excellent explanation of
the seemingly contradictory ﬁndings in the existing empirical literature. We stress
that our ﬁndings are not a result of assumptions on the operational level of the ﬁrm.
We conclude that there is a clear and direct association between CSR and diﬀerent
measures of corporate ﬁnancial performance.
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1. Introduction
What is the relation between corporate social performance (CSP) and cor-
porate ﬁnancial performance (CFP)? Analyzing ﬁnancial performance is cen-
tral in accounting and ﬁnance since the origin of enterprise. The naming and
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cent phenomenon. Generally, it is assumed that CSR is the taking account
of non-ﬁnancial consequences of production. Especially, concerns about the
natural environment, employees, ethics and society as a whole are thought to
constitute an important part of the ﬁrm’s responsible behavior (see Caroll,
1999, for an overview). Rating agencies like KLD and Ethical Investment Re-
search Service (EIRIS) have come up with large lists of issues they consider
when assessing CSR. For example, KLD analyzes charitable giving, relations
with indigenous people, the compensation of top management, employment
of women, minorities and disabled, the retirement beneﬁt program, the ﬁrm’s
liabilities for hazardous waste, use of recycled materials and alternative fuels,
etc. Among others, Geoﬀrey Heal (2005), has pointed out how CSR might
be related to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance. He ﬁnds six linkages: reducing
risk, reducing waste, improving relations with regulators, generating brand
equity, improving human relations and employee productivity, and lowering
the cost of capital. There is a growing empirical literature trying to obtain an
answer to this question. However, so far, the empirical results have not given a
clear-cut answer. In a survey of 95 empirical studies conducted between 1972-
2001, Margolis and Walsh (2001, p. 10), report that: “When treated as an
independent variable, corporate social performance is found to have a positive
relationship to ﬁnancial performance in 42 studies (53%), no relationship in 19
studies (24%), a negative relationship in 4 studies (5%), and a mixed relation-
ship in 15 studies (19%).” There are numerous explanations of these diverse
results, primarily in the business and operations management literature and
often presented in a rather ‘ad-hoc’ way (see McGuire et al., 1988; Heal, 2005;
McWilliams et al., 2006). However, there is no economic theory that tries to
incorporate socially responsible investment and corporate social responsibility
in a full equilibrium neo-classical framework 1 .
1 Worth mentioning is the model by Heinkel et al. (2001) in which green screening
takes place in the portfolio selection process. This model is similar to the model
of asymmetric information by Merton (1987), where “screening” takes place due to
the fact that some investors do not know about the existence of certain securities.
However, these studies analyze a partial equilibrium model and therefore fall short
of a full explanation of the empirical observations.
2The lack of a full equilibrium model has consequently created a lack of under-
standing and a misinterpretation of the empirical results with respect to the
relation between corporate social responsibility and corporate ﬁnancial perfor-
mance. In a world without externalities and with homogeneous agents, several
standard ﬁnancial performance measures can be interpreted in the same way
and partial equilibrium analysis is suﬃcient to develop a full understanding of
the relation. But with non-market costs, heterogeneous consumers, and het-
erogeneous production processes, these ﬁnancial performance measures need
not have the same interpretation, a consequence which partial equilibrium
analysis will not reveal. Although the focus of critiques has always been on
the measurement of “social performance”, ironically, we ﬁnd that it is the
diﬀerences in the operationalization of “ﬁnancial performance” that creates
the confusion. We demonstrate the source of this confusion utilizing a general
equilibrium stock market model. More speciﬁcally, we analyze the implications
of corporate social responsibility for three ﬁnancial performance measures that
are most often used in the empirical literature, namely: 1. the Market-to-Book
ratio (or Tobin’s Q); 2. Return on Assets (ROA) or similar accounting ratio’s
(Return On equity, Return On Investment, Return On Sales); 3. (Risk ad-
justed) stock market returns (Jensen’s alpha). We show that it makes a huge
diﬀerence which ﬁnancial performance measure is used when comparing so-
cially responsible ﬁrms to irresponsible ﬁrms. For Market-to-Book we expect
a positive relation with social performance, for ROA also a positive relation,
and for stock market returns this relation is ambiguous at the aggregate level
and negative at the industry level.
The intuition of our model is as follows. We introduce heterogeneous con-
sumers and heterogeneous ﬁrms in a general equilibrium stock market model
analogues to Diamond (1967). We assume that besides production of market-
traded goods, ﬁrms generate non-market costs through, for example, environ-
mental damage due to the use of real capital in production. Firms diﬀer in their
technology with respect to the amount of damage they create. Consumers have
an interest in ﬁrms via shareholdings and they diﬀer with respect to their pref-
erences over damage. First we show that a social planner’s solution coincides
3with the competitive stock market allocation, given that ﬁrms are maximizing
market value. This result is in accordance with the basic argument made by
Jensen (2002) that the single objective of a ﬁrm is to maximize its market
value. We deﬁne this type of corporate behavior as “socially responsible be-
havior”. The other type of behavior we consider is pure proﬁt maximization,
which diﬀers from market value maximization in this setting and we label it
“irresponsible behavior” as this type of behavior does not take into account
external or non-market costs. Analyzing corporate social responsibility in such
a way is in line with the deﬁnition of corporate social responsibility provided
by Heal (2005).
An outcome of market value maximization, i.e. socially responsible behavior,
is that socially responsible ﬁrms internalize some of the non-market costs by,
for instance, substituting labor for capital to reduce pollution. In other words,
they submit to a higher cost of capital compared to the market. Consequently,
the operating proﬁt measures such as Return on Assets, will be higher for
socially responsible ﬁrms. Another eﬀect is that ﬁrms that engage in social
responsibility generate less non-market costs and the demand for shares of
these ﬁrms will be higher compared to their irresponsible peers, since some
consumers who are also investors care about the social costs that are generated
by the ﬁrm besides the cash ﬂows. Consequently, the stock price and hence
the market value of the ﬁrm increases. The higher demand also increases the
Market-to-Book value relative to irresponsible ﬁrms.
We therefore have two opposing eﬀects of social responsibility on stock market
returns. First, as a result of a higher return on capital, the stock market returns
are relatively higher for socially responsible ﬁrms. Second, the increased stock
market value through the increased demand for shares reduces the relative
stock market return of socially responsible ﬁrms. In equilibrium the net eﬀect
is that irresponsible ﬁrms generate higher stock market returns relative to
their industry peers. However, both the diﬀerence in and the level of stock
market returns depend on the amount of damage per output, since ﬁrms in
industries that use more damaging technologies have a higher potential to
create value by internalizing non-market costs compared to ﬁrms in industries
4that use less polluting technologies. We consider industries that diﬀer with
respect to their “damage technology” and assume that the distribution of ﬁrms
that engage in corporate socially responsible behavior is unrelated to industry
type. Consequently, at the aggregate level it is ambiguous whether socially
responsible ﬁrms generate higher or lower stock market returns compared to
irresponsible ﬁrms. We emphasize that our model yields these results without
assuming any operational relation between proﬁts and socially responsible
behavior. Whatever relations there might exist on the operational level is
irrelevant to our results as these are simply a consequence of market clearing,
driven by investor preferences.
Having gained these new insights, we carefully inspect what types of ﬁnancial
performance measures are used in a large number of empirical studies. We
group the studies according to the ﬁnancial performance measure used and
inspect the observed relation of this measure with the measure of social re-
sponsibility. When the empirical results are presented this way, we ﬁnd that
they are not conﬂicting with our general equilibrium model. Therefore, we
conclude that our model is fully capable of explaining the various empirical
ﬁndings on the relation between CSR and ﬁnancial performance, which implies
that the existing empirical evidence is not mixed, but in fact very strong.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give
the ingredients of the model. In Section 3. we calculate the optimal allocation
by a social planner. Then we introduce ﬁnancial markets and analyze the
eﬀects of two types of behavior, namely socially responsible behavior (market
value maximization) and irresponsible behavior (pure proﬁt maximization)
on three diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial performance measures. In Section 5. we
relate our results to the existing empirical literature and discuss our ﬁndings.
Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
52. Technology, preferences, and states of nature
We consider n ﬁrms and we assume that production by ﬁrm i can be written
as a decomposable function of capital intensity ki and a random variable θ
reﬂecting the state of nature, as in Diamond (1967). The output of ﬁrm i
when state θ occurs is given by:
yi(ki,θ) = gi(θ)fi(ki) (1)
with f0
i(ki) > 0, f00
i (ki) < 0. We also assume that fi(ki) is homogeneous of
degree αi with respect to ki. Modeled as a decomposable production function,
output is scaled by the state of nature, but output patterns are not aﬀected
by diﬀerent choices of inputs. Moreover, the ﬁrm generates an economic bad,
which we may think of as environmental damage, and for simplicity we assume
it is proportional to production:
D
i = D
i(fi(ki)) = Difi(ki) (2)
Environmental damage is produced with certainty, so it is state independent. It
is quite a natural assumption that capital intensity is related to environmental
damage. We can also give a diﬀerent interpretation to Eq. (2) in terms of
social costs for employees. If a ﬁrm hires relatively more employees, it can
reduce the work load per employee and therefore the work-related stress, so
that more men on the job increases health and safety conditions. A higher
number of employees reduces capital intensity so that there is a correlation
between total social damage and capital intensity. Note that we do not go
into the matter of how this relationship between capital intensity and social
costs aﬀects operations or proﬁtability. Furthermore, we assume that each ﬁrm
produces the same good and the same bad. The reason for this single good
approach is that we want to be able to interpret the production of the good
as perfectly substitutable cash ﬂows received by a shareholder 2 .
2 Note that later it will turn out that shares are not perfect substitutes, which is
not merely due to uncertainty, but to diﬀerences in the levels of damage produced
by ﬁrms.
6There are m consumers and consumer j has individual preferences for the
good and the bad which are represented by a utility function Uj(c,d), where





dj < 0. We will make some further restrictive assumptions on tech-
nology and preferences, which do not drive our results, but allow for explicit
solutions and a better intuition. We assume constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) preferences and a constant marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and damage. Furthermore, gi(θ) ∼ N(1,σ2
i) and we consider the
simple case where covariances between the gi(θ)’s equal zero 3 . An agent wants
to maximize expected utility:
Vj = E[Uj(cj,dj)] (3)
There are some issues with modeling preferences over social damage this way.
For example, the environment is a public good. Moreover, the generated social
damage need not be a physical product. However, in order not to blur the
analysis with free-rider eﬀects, underprovision, or other problems related to
non-market costs, we treat the bad as a divisible, privately owned product.
This type of preference representation does not provide a detailed description
of the actual mechanism that drives socially responsible investment behavior.
Nonetheless, it does account for a group of investors who are interested in
aspects of the ﬁrm other than cash-ﬂows. So for now, we simply treat social
damage as a negatively valued product, but we will discuss this in more detail
later.
3. A centrally planned economy
We examine a centrally planned economy, in which a social planner tries to ﬁnd
a Pareto optimal allocation in terms of expected utility Vj. By analogy with
Diamond (1967) the planner has full control over the allocation of the produc-
3 This is not strictly necessary and one can in principle incorporate covariances
in the analysis, however we choose to omit them since the eﬀects of covariances
on prices and portfolio selection are well known and do not aﬀect our analysis
qualitatively. See, for example, Cochrane, 2001.
7tion factors, but has limited control over the allocation of output. Hence, we
consider a social planner with somewhat limited powers. The reason is that a
planner with full control could in principle come up with an allocation that
is achieved by a competitive economy with a complete set of contingent com-
modity markets (see Arrow and Debreu, 1954). However, we look at a limited
set of markets, i.e. we do not allow for insurance companies etc., and therefore
assume that the cost elements that restrict the set of markets limits a social
planner in the same way. Accordingly, we choose the planner’s powers in such
a way that the competitive economy with a stock market can in principle
generate the same allocation as the social planner.
More precisely, the planner has to come up with a distribution of production
before the state of nature is known, so instructions are given to the ﬁrms
before production is completed. Firm i is instructed to deliver a fraction αij
of its output to individual j, independent of the state of nature. This implies









Furthermore, total consumption should equal total output which is a restric-
tion on the αij’s:
m X
j=1
αij = 1 (6)
and we have a constraint on available capital:
m X
i=1
ki = ¯ k (7)
A Pareto allocation is then found by maximizing the utility of the ﬁrst con-
sumer
E[U1(c1,d1)]
subject to m − 1 constraints on the expected utility of the other consumers
E[Uj(cj,dj)] = ¯ Vj
8where the ¯ Vj’s are reservation levels of expected utility of consumers, j =
1,..,m. We rewrite the constraint Eq. (6) so that αi1 = 1 −
Pm
j=2 αij . Then





























































































i = 1,2,..,n (10)















We substitute these two equations in Eq. (9) and Eq. (10). Then we combine
these ﬁrst order conditions by substituting for the Lagrange multiplier νj. If




















,i = 2,3,..,m (11)
9This expression equates the marginal rate of transformation with the expected
marginal rates of substitution. Comparing this result to Diamond (1967) we
observe that the marginal rates of substitution are adjusted for social costs.
4. Stock market equilibrium
In this section we introduce ﬁnancial markets. Preferences, technology and
the states of nature are unchanged, but trade on a stock market is allowed
and we have production factor markets and a bond market. Firms hire fac-
tors and reward factors with payments independent of the state of nature. We
ﬁrst describe the portfolio selection process of consumers. Then we introduce
two types of corporate behavior, namely socially responsible and irrespon-
sible behavior, and characterize the market equilibrium. Next we study the
implications of the types of corporate behavior for three widely used ﬁnancial
performance measures; namely the Market-to-Book ratio, Return on Assets,
and stock market returns. We illustrate our propositions with a numerical
example.
4.1. Portfolio selection
A consumer has initial wealth Wj, which consists of initial shareholdings and
production factors. Assets are indexed by i and generate payoﬀs Ri and dam-
age Di. The consumer receives these cash and pollution ﬂows proportional to
his shareholdings. Asset i can be bought at price pi. Consumers can also buy
bonds and the price of a bond is the numeraire. Since one unit of a bond is
a commitment to pay a ﬁxed amount of r units of consumption, this is a risk
free and pollution free asset. The consumer receives ﬁxed payments for both
his initial inputs and the amount of bonds he holds. Let bj be the total amount
of bonds plus the real capital endowments of consumer j. An investor chooses


















where the ωij is the number of shares consumer j holds in ﬁrm i and the last












where κ is the Lagrange multiplier. Taking the derivative yields the ﬁrst order






i − piκ = 0 (12)
Bond holders and suppliers of input factors have no voting rights with respect
to corporate decisions and are not held responsible for the social damage
generated by the ﬁrm. This justiﬁes why we consider the risk free assets to be
pollution free assets as well. Taking the derivative with respect to bj gives us






















































where the last result is obtained by noting that if two random variables x and
z are jointly normally distributed then cov[g(x),z] = E[g0(x)]cov[x,z] due to





















the implicit subjective conversion price, or the subjective marginal rate of
substitution, of environmental damage to consumption of consumer j. We can
write Eq. (17) in a familiar form. For this demonstration, we normalize the
price of asset i to one, so that we have an expression in terms of returns:
E[Ri] = r + λjD
i + δcov[cj,Ri] (18)
This equation is a modiﬁed CAPM equation, with a term adding to the inter-
cept, which can be interpreted as a “social cost premium”. With non-market
costs, an asset’s return, and speciﬁcally alpha, depends on other characteris-
tics than ﬁnancial risk. Therefore, our model predicts that a signiﬁcant part
of investor behavior is aﬀected by non-ﬁnancial characteristics of the ﬁrm. We
can give a very general interpretation to these non-ﬁnancial characteristics,
for instance, potential consumer boycotts or environmental scandals. Each in-
dividual investor has subjective believes on the possibility of these occurring,
reﬂected by the parameter λj. So, basically, we are saying that Di represents
any liability or negatively valued characteristic of the ﬁrm that cannot be
observed in ﬁnancial statements.
We deﬁne the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i by µi = E[Ri], and its variance by
¯ σi
2 = Var[Ri]. We further assume that agents diﬀer only with respect to their
marginal rate of substitution, so that λj corresponds to agent j = 1,...,n.
With CARA preferences and a constant marginal rate of substitution between




[µi − δωij ¯ σi
2 − λjD
i] (19)
which we can express as a demand function for shares:






We see that a consumer with a higher preference for environmental quality
(high λj) will hold less of the share if the ﬁrm pollutes. Furthermore, higher
risk lowers demand proportional to the risk aversion of investors.
Suppose there are Ni shares for ﬁrm i. In equilibrium it must hold that the
total demand for shares equals the number of shares
m X
j=1
ωij = Ni (21)
which yields 


























If we deﬁne ¯ λ = (1/m)
Pm
j=1 λj as the average rate of substitution between
consumption and damage and normalize the number of shares and consumers
to one, m = Ni = 1, we get that the stock market value of the ﬁrm Mi is:
Mi = pi =
1
r
[µi − δ ¯ σi
2 − ¯ λD
i] (24)
These results are similar to Heinkel et al. (2001) and Merton (1987) in the
case of no shortselling. If shortselling is not allowed it means that the demand
for shares, Eq. (20), cannot become negative. Then, for very polluting ﬁrms
(high λjDi), Eq. (20) is a binding constraint since ωij needs to be nonnegative
and so demand for very polluting ﬁrms is equal to zero. In this case environ-
mental screening takes place, since some stocks are omitted from the selection
process. If shortselling is restricted and we have a dichotomous distribution for
13agents’ preferences (so either a very high λj or λj = 0), we get the model with
environmental screening of Heinkel et al. (2001). Similarly, we have the Mer-
ton model of incomplete information, if we interpret damage Di as the “(...)
shadow cost of not knowing about security i (...)” (Merton, 1987, p. 491). Both
environmental screening and asymmetric information lower the market value
of polluting and unknown ﬁrms. Restricting shortselling complicates the sum-
mation in Eq.(21), but will yield qualitatively similar results to the case where
shortselling is allowed. In our model, we do include shortselling since we want
to obtain an explicit expression for pi without specifying the functional form
of λj. As in the case of no shortselling, higher environmental damage lowers
the market value of the ﬁrm when shortselling is allowed. Therefore, the choice
of whether or not to allow for shortselling has no qualitative consequences for
the comparative static eﬀects.
4.2. Corporate behavior
The ﬁrm guarantees a payment of r to the production factors irrespective of
the state of nature and hence it satisﬁes the deﬁnition of the risk-free rate.
Proﬁts of the ﬁrm are given by:
πi = gi(θ)fi(ki) − rki (25)
Expected proﬁts and the variance of proﬁts are:
µi = E[π








Deﬁne total value of the ﬁrm as the market value plus the capital stock,
Mi + ki. Using Eq. (2), Eq. (24), and Eq. (26)-(27) we ﬁnd the value of the
ﬁrm in equilibrium:
Mi + ki =
1
r












i (ki) − ¯ λDifi(ki)] (28)
14So we can see that the value of the ﬁrm only depends on output and not on the
ﬁnancing structure, which is in accordance with Modigliani and Miller (1958).
Suppose the ﬁrm wants to maximize its market value. We assumed a decom-
posable production function so the eﬀect of the state of nature is multiplica-
tive. As a price taker, the ﬁrm calculates that its value will change in pro-
portion to output. This means that when doubling inputs, the ﬁrm calculates




and hence the stock market value:
fi(2ki)
fi(ki)
(Mi + ki) − 2ki
In general, when the input level and market value equal ˆ ki, ˆ Mi, the ﬁrm




( ˆ Mi + ˆ ki) − ki
The ﬁrm chooses the input level such that the derivative of the market value
with respect to ki equals zero, which yields at the equilibrium input level where




(Mi + ki) = 1 (29)
Substituting the expression for the market value of the ﬁrm Eq. (28) in Eq.
















ifi(ki) − ¯ λDi] = r (30)
If we consider the numerator of the left hand side of Eq. (11), f0
1, to be as-
sociated with the risk free, pollution free technology, then we can substitute
f0





for the risk free technology (i = 1) the numerator of the right hand side of Eq.
(11) is equal to E[U0
c1]. Substituting these expressions in Eq. (11) and averag-
ing over all consumers to get the average λj and noting that
Pm
j=1 αij = 1, we
15see that Eq. (30) is equal to the social planner’s solution Eq. (11) 4 .
This is the argument made by Michael Jensen:“value is created when a ﬁrm
produces an output or set of outputs that are valued by its customers at
more than the value of the inputs it consumes (as valued by their suppliers)
in such production” (Jensen, 2002, p. 239). Consequently, ﬁrms should have
one objective and that is to maximize the value of the ﬁrm. This is often
wrongly interpreted as “ﬁrms should maximize proﬁts”. This is the statement
that is put forward by Milton Friedman (1970), who has claimed that “The
social responsibility of business is to increase its proﬁts” 5 . However, if a ﬁrm
creates several outputs, of which some are negatively valued, maximizing the
long-term value of the ﬁrm is no longer the same as maximizing proﬁts. Even
if the negatively valued output is, in principle, marketable, by free disposal
it will have a price equal to zero, which favors pure proﬁts. Hence, there is a
diﬀerence between pure proﬁt maximization and ﬁrm value maximization. Of
course, ﬁrms can still be over or under valued with respect to their created
non-market costs due to free-rider eﬀects, myopic behavior, or mis-pricing in
general, leading to pollution levels that are too high, but that does not mean
that Jensen’s basic argument is wrong.
Friedman argues that ﬁrms are taxing consumers through reduced proﬁts by
4 Note that the assumption that produces this result with such ease is that damage
is proportional to capital intensity. This justiﬁes the believe of the ﬁrm that its
market value changes proportional to output. If damage is not proportional to per
capita output then the derivation becomes more complicated.
5 Arguments can be made to support this claim. If the non-market costs are incor-
porated through consumption behavior on the consumption good market, Friedman
is right. However, this mechanism assumes that consumers have perfect information
about all production processes in the supply chain of intermediate goods, on top of
information about the production process of the resulting ﬁnal good. In practice,
this is almost impossible to keep track of (for an interesting story of a scholar who
tried to do this for a t-shirt, see Rivoli, 2005). This makes it less likely that all the
social costs generated by each ﬁrm in the supply chain are incorporated in the price
of the ﬁnal good. Therefore, we argue, that information asymmetries and resulting
externalities are more likely to be present in the consumer goods market compared
to the stock market, since shareholders as owners of the ﬁrm are more directly in-
volved in the production process. Consequently, maximizing proﬁts is no longer the
same as maximizing ﬁrm value.
16engaging in corporate social responsibility and that consumers can spend on
social responsibility programs themselves if they want to. However, this ar-
gument fails to acknowledge that pollution due to production can also be
considered to be a form of taxation. From an eﬃciency point of view it might
be better to prevent environmental damage, rather than to deal with it in-
directly by cleaning it up later. Our model shows that prevention is indeed
preferable, as proﬁt maximizing behavior generates a market outcome that is
diﬀerent from a social planner’s solution. Comparing the planner’s outcome
to a proﬁt maximizing market equilibrium, the increased proﬁts in such an
equilibrium can never outweigh the higher social costs of production. We do
not even mention the fact that for some damaging processes it might be phys-
ically impossible to undo them, implying a social cost of inﬁnity, which makes
the argument trivial.
We consider two types of corporate behavior. The ﬁrst is socially responsi-
ble behavior. Since maximizing market value yields the social optimum, we
consider it to be consistent with corporate social responsibility. So a socially
responsible ﬁrm maximizes its stock market value. The second type of cor-
porate behavior is pure proﬁt maximization without considering non-market
costs. We call this irresponsible behavior. So the irresponsible ﬁrm uses a cost
of capital that is too low, i.e. it only pays the risk-free rate plus a risk pre-
mium, but not a pollution premium. A socially responsible ﬁrm (SR) sets its





1 − δ¯ σ2
SR − ¯ λDSR (31)










SRfSR(kSR) and ¯ σ2
IR := σ2
IRfIR(kIR). The diﬀerence between
the two expressions is that the irresponsible ﬁrm does not consider the social
costs ¯ λDIR. This is in line with the deﬁnition of corporate social responsibility
by Heal (2005, p. 393): “CSR involves taking actions which reduce the extent
of externalized costs or avoid distributional conﬂicts”. Note that the choice of
17being socially responsible or socially irresponsible is exogenous to our model.
There is no economic mechanism that forces ﬁrms to be socially responsible 6 .
4.3. Implications
In this section, we will explore the implications of a ﬁrm’s choice to operate
socially responsible on ﬁnancial performance. The bulk of empirical studies
on socially responsible investment basically adopt the intuition of Eq. (24),
namely that in equilibrium there is a trade-oﬀ between stock-market returns
and corporate social responsibility. It is then assumed that any ﬁnancial per-
formance measure will reveal this. Next, ﬁnancial performance measures of
socially responsible ﬁrms are compared with ﬁnancial performance measures
of irresponsible ﬁrms. Note that this logic is based on a partial equilibrium
result assuming either identical production technologies with respect to pol-
lution standards in each sector or a homogeneous distribution with respect to
CSR behavior among diﬀerent sectors. We present three general equilibrium
results that show that for comparison purposes between socially responsible
and irresponsible ﬁrms, it matters what kind of ﬁnancial performance mea-
sure is used. We choose to discuss the properties of three measures of ﬁnancial
performance that are widely used in the empirical literature. These three are
Market-to-Book (or Tobin’s Q), Return on Assets and Stock Market Returns.
Proposition 1 Deﬁne the Market-to-Book ratio as total market value divided
by installed capital, (M + k)/k. Consider the degree of homogeneity αi = α
for all ﬁrms. It then follows that:
(1) the Market-to-Book ratio of socially responsible ﬁrms is always larger than
the Market-to-Book ratio of irresponsible ﬁrms, irrespective of the level of
damage per output
(2) the Market-to-Book ratio of socially responsible ﬁrms is constant, irre-
spective of the level of damage per output
6 If shareholders disagree with the policy of a ﬁrm they can either sell the stocks
(Exit) or try to inﬂuence ﬁrm policy at shareholder meetings (Voice). As we assume
that the individual investor is small, the latter is not an option.




Substituting Eq. (31) in Eq. (28) we have that the total market value of a
socially responsible ﬁrm is equal to MSR + kSR = kSRα−1, so the Market-to-
Book ratio is equal to (MSR + kSR)/kSR = α−1 which does not depend on
the level of social damage. Substituting Eq. (32) in Eq. (28) we have that the







< α−1 = (MSR + kSR)/kSR. 2
Note that this result holds even if risk levels diﬀer, since the market value is
determined by the appropriate discount rate. A responsible ﬁrm is maximizing
market value, so it will install capital until the unique optimal Market-to-Book
value is attained.
Proposition 2 Deﬁne the Return on Assets ratio (ROA) as proﬁts divided
by installed capital, π/k. Consider the degree of homogeneity αi = α for all
ﬁrms. We correct ROA for risk, that is we compare ROA for identical risk
levels. It then follows that:
(1) ROA of socially responsible ﬁrms is always larger than ROA of irrespon-
sible ﬁrms
(2) ROA of irresponsible ﬁrms is constant, but for socially responsible ﬁrms
is increasing in damage per output Di
PROOF. Again, note that if fi(ki) is homogeneous of the degree alpha then
f0
i(ki)ki
fi(ki) = α. Using the deﬁnition of proﬁts we have ROA = πi/ki = fi(ki)/ki−
rki/ki = f0
i(ki)/α − r. Substituting for f0





α(1 − δ¯ σ2
IR)
− r
which does not depend damage per output Di. For socially responsible ﬁrms
we substitute for f0




α(1 − δ¯ σ2
SR − ¯ λDSR)
− r






α(1 − δ¯ σ2
SR − ¯ λDSR)
−
r
α(1 − δ¯ σ2
IR)
> 0
given that risk is identical ¯ σ2
SR = ¯ σ2
IR. 2
By setting a lower capital-labor ratio, the socially responsible ﬁrm achieves two
things. First, it reduces some of its social costs. Second, it creates a higher
ROA to compensate for social costs. In a conventional setting, observing a
ROA that is too high would induce additional investments, since the optimal
Market-to-Book ratio has not been reached. However, with non-market costs,
socially responsible investors appreciate this behavior, which is reﬂected in
the stock price. Consequently, the optimal Market-to-Book ratio is achieved
by choosing a lower capital-labor ratio.
Proposition 3 Deﬁne stock market returns as π/M. Assume that whether or
not a ﬁrm engages in corporate social responsibility is unrelated to its technol-
ogy. More speciﬁcally, the choice is assumed to be unrelated to the per output
created social costs Di. It then follows that
(1) the sign of the diﬀerence in risk-adjusted stock market returns of socially
responsible ﬁrms and irresponsible ﬁrms is ambiguous. Moreover, this
even holds when all ﬁrms have the same degree of homogeneity; αi = α.
(2) socially responsible ﬁrms have lower stock market returns compared to
irresponsible ﬁrms within the same industry (that is, for ﬁrms with the
same damage per output Di) .




can see the intuition of the ambiguity. ROA is higher for socially responsible
ﬁrms, but Market-to-Book is lower for irresponsible ﬁrms. However, this does
not prove anything yet, as one of the two eﬀects could be dominating. We as-
sume that the levels of risk are identical ¯ σ2
SR = ¯ σ2
IR = σ2. Using the expression
for ROA and Market-to-Book, we can express the stock market returns of the
20socially responsible ﬁrm as
πSR
MSR =
A + rα¯ λDSR
B − (1 − α)¯ λDSR




B − ¯ λDIR
with A = r(1 − α(1 − δσ2)) and B = (1 − α)(1 − δσ2). Note that both are
increasing in damage per output. The sign of the diﬀerence of these two equa-
tions depends on the combination of DSR and DIR. More speciﬁcally, stock
market returns of the irresponsible and Responsible ﬁrm are identical if:
DSR = DIR
1 − α(1 − δσ2)
1 − α(1 + ¯ λDIR)
If DSR is higher than the right-hand side of this equation, then the socially
responsible ﬁrm has higher stock market returns, otherwise lower. Since the
fraction on the right hand side is larger than or equal to 1, we see that if
DSR = DIR, that is we compare within one industry, we have that stock
market returns are lower for socially responsible ﬁrms. 2
The underlying intuition is that CSR is a measure of the degree of internaliza-
tion of non-market costs, not just the extent to which it creates non-market
costs. A more polluting industry has to compensate more for its pollution
if it wants to be labeled socially responsible. Unless we identify what drives
ﬁrms to engage in corporate social responsibility, we cannot say much on stock
market returns of socially responsible ﬁrms at the aggregate level.
Note that all of the results hold without assuming anything on the operational
relation between productivity and pollution. Whether or not more polluting
ﬁrms are more productive is irrelevant to our general equilibrium analysis.
214.4. Numerical illustration
In this section, we give a numerical example to give a feel for how our the-
oretical model could be tested empirically. For this example, we consider a
world with no uncertainty, so σ2 = 0 and we assume that every ﬁrm uses a
Cobb-Douglas production technology, given by fi(ki) = f(ki) =
√
ki, where ki
is the capital-labor ratio. For ease of discussion, we interpret the social cost
of production as pollution in this example. Furthermore, we assume that a
ﬁrm can act according to the two types of behavior we discussed before. The
ﬁrst is CSR, which is maximization of stock market value. The other kind of
behavior is pure proﬁt maximization. So, for a socially responsible ﬁrm, we
have according to Eq. (31):
f
0(ki) = r/(1 − ¯ λDi)
For a ﬁrm that simply maximizes proﬁts πi = f(ki)−rki; e.g. it does not take
all the shareholders’ preferences in account but only those with low preference
for the environment, we get the simpliﬁed version of Eq. (32):
f
0(ki) = r
In Table 1, we give a numerical example, given this simple structure. This
Table presents hypothetical ﬁnancial reports by 6 diﬀerent companies that
diﬀer with respect to pollution per output, which we consider to be diﬀerent
across industries, and which diﬀer with respect to corporate behavior. Our
model gives apparent tools for empirical work, as a lot of these ﬁnancial ratio’s
are publicly available. Moreover, it points out that supposing that screening
only takes place with respect to environmental damage levels is wrong. There
is a diﬀerence between CSR screening and green screening. Let us say that
the threshold damage level of including a company at 0.41. Then the clean
irresponsible ﬁrm (bottom right in Table 1) is included in the portfolio but
the responsible dirty ﬁrm (Top Left) not, whereas this latter ﬁrm creates more
net value for the green shareholder. Again this illustrates that CSR is not just
a question of how dirty a ﬁrm is but whether the ﬁrm takes its dirtiness into
account when making production decisions. When screening takes place based
22on the total amount of pollution ﬁrms create, the screened ﬁrms can be socially
responsible as well as irresponsible.
Suppose that the “Dirty” industry in Table 1 has had a lot of pressure from,
for example, NGO’s or consumer boycotts. Each ﬁrm in the “Dirty” industry
behaves socially responsible and hence only ﬁnancial reports in accordance
with the top left of Table 1 are observed. The two other industries (“Normal”
and “Clean”) are acting irresponsible, so for those ﬁrms we observe reports
according to the bottom center and bottom right of Table 1 respectively. Let us
use these reports to compare stock market returns of socially responsible versus
irresponsible ﬁrms. The return of responsible ﬁrms is 0.5, and the average of
the two irresponsible ﬁrms between 0.42 and 0.5. In this case responsible ﬁrms
generate higher stock market returns.
Let us now consider the reverse case where the “Normal” industry is acting
socially responsible, but the “Clean” and “Dirty” are not. Then the return of
the responsible ﬁrms is 0.42, and the average return of the two irresponsible
ﬁrms between 0.42 and 0.75. Now we have the result that irresponsible ﬁrms
generate higher returns compared to the example above where socially respon-
sible ﬁrms generate higher returns. Unless one can identify a relation between
industry type and the choice of being socially responsible, looking at stock
market returns is not going to give clear-cut results and Market-to-Book (in
this framework) is a better indicator. In the next section we illustrate that the
paradoxical implications of CSR on ﬁnancial performance have unnecessarily
created confusion in the empirical literature.
5. Discussion
The empirical ﬁndings on the relation between Corporate Social Performance
(CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) appear to be contradict-
ing. However, using our model we show that in fact this is not the case. Much
of the confusion is generated by the use of the term “ﬁnancial performance”
for diﬀerent ﬁnancial indicators. As we showed in the previous section, it mat-
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Numerical example of ﬁnancial indicators of socially responsible vs irre-
sponsible ﬁrms.
INDUSTRY TYPE
BEHAVIOR Dirty Normal Clean
(λDi = 1/3) (λDi = 1/4) (λDi = 1/5)
socially responsible
Capital installed k 1.78 2.25 2.56
Stock Market value M 1.78 2.25 2.56
Total Market Value M + k 3.56 4.50 5.12
Market-to-Book (M + k)/(k) 2.00 2.00 2.00
Proﬁts π 0.89 0.94 0.96
Stock Market Return π/M 0.50 0.42 0.38
Return On Assets π/k 0.50 0.42 0.38
Social costs of Pollution Di 0.44 0.38 0.32
irresponsible
Capital installed k 4.00 4.00 4.00
Stock Market value M 1.33 2.00 2.40
Total Market Value M + k 5.33 6.00 6.40
Market-to-Book (M + k)/(k) 1.33 1.50 1.60
Proﬁts π 1.00 1.00 1.00
Stock Market Return π/M 0.75 0.50 0.42
Return On Assets π/k 0.25 0.25 0.25
Social costs of Pollution Di 0.67 0.50 0.40
We consider three industries that diﬀer with respect to their pollution per output,
¯ λDi and two types of corporate behavior; socially responsible and irresponsible
behavior. Socially responsible ﬁrms set k such that f0(ki) = r/(1 − ¯ λDi)
irresponsible ﬁrms set f0(ki) = r. Calculations are made using f(k) =
√
k, r = 1/4,
π = f(k) − r(k), M = (π − λDi)/r, Di = Dif(ki). See text for a derivation of
these formulas.
ters what kind of ﬁnancial performance measure actually is being used. If
Market-to-Book is the ﬁnancial performance measure, one can expect a pos-
itive relation between CSP and CFP. For Return-on-Assets we also expect a
positive relation. However, for stock market returns the relation is negative at
the industry level and ambiguous at the aggregate level.
We will relate our propositions to the ﬁndings in the empirical literature, care-
fully paying attention to what type of performance measure is used. For this
purpose, we consulted two widely cited survey articles on the link between
Corporate Social Performance and Corporate Financial Performance, namely
Margolis and Walsh (2001) and Orlitzky et al. (2003). We classify the studies
according to the ﬁnancial performance measure used and relate the empiri-
cal ﬁndings to our propositions. Therefore, we only look at studies that use
24Market-to-Book, Return on Assets 7 or stock market returns. This results in
a survey of 67 studies.
5.1. Studies using Market-to-Book
Proposition 1 predicts that the Market-to-Book ratio should be higher for
socially responsible ﬁrms compared to irresponsible ﬁrms, but that across
industries the Market-to-Book is constant for socially responsible ﬁrms, inde-
pendent of the amount of damage per unit of production. In the two review
studies used, there are only a few studies that use Market-to-Book, or equiva-
lently Tobin’s Q, as a ﬁnancial performance measure to investigate the relation
between CSR and ﬁnancial performance. The usual way to measure Tobin’s
Q is to calculate the ratio of the stock market value of the company to the
cost of its tangible assets. Table 2 shows that all studies that have used the
Market-to-Book index ﬁnd a strong and positive relationship between corpo-
rate social performance and Market-to-Book. This is in line with Proposition
1. For example, King and Lenox (2001) also use Tobin’s Q and they make a
distinction in industries. We quote their ﬁndings:
We ﬁnd evidence of a real association between lower pollution and higher ﬁ-
nancial performance. We also show that a ﬁrm’s environmental performance
relative to its industry is associated with higher ﬁnancial performance. We
cannot show conclusively, however, that a ﬁrm’s choice to operate in cleaner
industries is associated with better ﬁnancial performance (..).
King and Lenox (2001, p. 106). This is exactly what Proposition 1 predicts,
namely that Tobin’s Q is constant across industries for socially responsible
ﬁrms and relatively lower for irresponsible ﬁrms, independent of the environ-
mental performance of the industry. Heal (2005) had already come to this
conclusion and mentions “One robust result seems to be that superior envi-
ronmental performance is correlated with high values for Tobin’s Q” (Heal,
2005, p. 402).
7 We also included in this category measures that were equivalent, e.g. Return on
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Studies using Market-to-Book
Authors Relationship Strength of result
Brown and Perry (1994) positive strong
Dowell Hart and Yeung (2000) positive strong
Fombrun and Shanley (1990) positive strong
King and Lenox (2001) positive strong
Studies using Market-to-Book (Tobin’s Q) ﬁnd a positive relation between
Corporate Social Performance and Corporate Financial Performance.
5.2. Studies using Return on Assets
Proposition 2 tells us that we should observe a higher Return on Assets
(ROA) for socially responsible ﬁrms, since these internalize non-market costs
by adopting a higher cost of capital compared to the market cost of capital.
Furthermore, ROA is constant across industries for irresponsible ﬁrms, since
they all face the same cost of capital, but for socially responsible ﬁrms, ROA
is proportional to the amount of pollution per output.
In Table 3 we present 36 studies that used Return on Assets or a comparable
accounting measure. First note that not one study ﬁnds a strictly negative
relationship. Furthermore, 17 out of 18 studies, that are classiﬁed as presenting
either strong or moderate evidence, ﬁnd a positive relationship which is in line
with Proposition 2. Overall, 27 out of 36 studies ﬁnd a positive relationship and
the studies that are classiﬁed as presenting weak evidence ﬁnd no relationship.
Note that most of these studies date back to the 70s and 80s when data
availability was a problem.
There is additional evidence that supports Proposition 2. Spencer and Taylor
(1987) note that the relationship is valid at the industry level. This means
that diﬀerences in ROA are not due to diﬀerences in production technologies
(αi in our model). This evidence is supported by Griﬃn and Mahon (1997),
who look at a single industry and ﬁnd a positive relationship between ROA
and corporate social performance, and also by Dooley and Lerner (1994), who
use as an indicator a ﬁrm’s ROA relative to the industry average ROA and
ﬁnd the predicted positive relationship.
Equity (ROE), Return on Investment (ROI) and Return on Sales (ROS).
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Studies using Return on Assets or equivalent measure
Authors Relationship Strength of result
Berman et al. (1999) Positive Strong
Brown and Perry (1994) Positive Strong
Dooley and Lerner (1994) Positive Strong
Judge and Douglas (1998) Positive Strong
Preston and O’bannon (1997) Positive Strong
Simerly (1995) Positive Strong
Waddock and Graves (1997) Positive Strong
Graves and Waddock (1994) Positive Moderate
Graves and Waddock (2000) Positive Moderate
Hart and Ahuja (1996) Positive Moderate
Heinze (1976) Positive Moderate
Herremans et al. (1993) Positive Moderate
McGuire et al. (1988) Positive Moderate
Russo and Fouts (1997) Positive Moderate
Spencer and Taylor (1987) Positive Moderate
Turban and Greening (1997) Positive Moderate
Abbott and Monsen (1979) Positive Weak
Anderson and Frankle (1980) Positive Weak
Bowman (1978) Positive Weak
Bragdon and Marlin (1972) Positive Weak
Griﬃn and Mahon (1997) Positive Weak
Marcus and Goodman (1986) Positive Weak
Parket and Eilbirt (1975) Positive Weak
Pava and Krausz (1995) Positive Weak
Wokutch and Spencer (1987) Positive Weak
Preston (1978) Positive N/A
Greening (1995) Positive N/A
Johnson and Greening (1999) No Eﬀect/Positive Moderate
Cochran and Wood (1984) No Eﬀect/Mixed Weak
Patten (1991) No Eﬀect Strong
Aupperle et al. (1985) No Eﬀect Weak
Chen and Metcalf (1980) No Eﬀect Weak
Freedman and Jaggi (1982) No Eﬀect Weak
Ingram and Frazier (1980) No Eﬀect Weak
O’Neill et al. (1989) No Eﬀect Weak
Rocknness et al. (1986) No Eﬀect Weak
Studies using Accounting Data (ROA/ROE/ROI/ROS) ﬁnd merely positive
relations between Corporate Social Performance and Corporate Financial
Performance.
5.3. Studies using stock market returns
First of all, Proposition 3 holds only if there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in CSR
performance across industries. Cotrill (1990) shows that this is indeed the
27case. Moreover, it is mainly polluting industries that are engaging in CSR.
According to Proposition 3 this will dampen the diﬀerence between stock
market returns of socially responsible companies and irresponsible companies.
Table 4 gives an overview of studies that have used stock market returns as a
ﬁnancial performance measure. We grouped these studies in comparison stud-
ies and event studies. The reason is that event studies have to be interpreted
diﬀerently. We will discuss this later.
For the comparison studies (top half of Table 4) the ﬁndings diﬀer considerably
and the majority of the studies ﬁnds mixed eﬀects or no eﬀect, which is in line
with Proposition 3. Furthermore, McGuire et al. (1988) note that the positive
relationship they ﬁnd is stronger for accounting measures (ROA, ROE). This is
in line with our theory, since the relatively higher demand for shares of socially
responsible ﬁrms dampens the stock market return of these ﬁrms. Moreover,
according to Proposition 3, we should observe a negative relationship if we
look at diﬀerences in stock market returns within one industry. Newgren et al.
(1985) look at ﬁnancial performance relative to average industry performance
and indeed ﬁnd a negative relationship 8 .
Event studies (bottom half of Table 4) can be expected to present a less
conﬂicting picture as they compare the returns of a ﬁrm to the ﬁrm itself.
However, the problem with event studies is that it may be unclear whether
or not the “event” is actually providing new information to investors. If this
is not the case, then this action will not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the stock price.
Consistent with the usage of the researchers, the results of the event studies
in Table 4 are given the interpretation “positive”, if news on increased social
damage reduces the stock price signiﬁcantly in the event window. However,
such a correction of the stock price results in higher stock market returns for
these ﬁrms, given that operating proﬁts are not aﬀected by the news. So in a
8 In fact Newgren et al. (1985) look at the Price/Earnings index relative to the
industry Price/Earnings index and ﬁnd a positive relationship between this indicator
and corporate social performance. Note however, that the Price/Earnings index
is inversely related to stock market return, which in a steady state is equal to
the Earnings/Price index. Therefore we label this result as negative to make it
comparable to the other studies.
28way, it would have been better if the researchers had labeled this relation as
negative, since socially responsible ﬁrms exhibit relatively lower stock market
returns accordingly.
In line with Proposition 3, most event studies ﬁnd the expected “positive”
relationship, however, two studies on the withdrawal of international ﬁrms
from South-Africa in the 1980s give a negative relationship. Then again, the
studies on this speciﬁc subject present contradicting results and we also feel
that withdrawal from a country is much more complex information compared
to simple reported pollution levels.
5.4. Evaluation
Categorizing the empirical results according to the ﬁnancial performance mea-
sure used, our overview shows that most of the observed relationships are not
contradicting at all. There is a clear-cut relation between particular indicators
of ﬁnancial performance and CSR. To be more precise, particular ﬁnancial
indicators (Market-to-Book, ROA) are to be positively associated with CSR
and stock market returns can be either positively or negatively associated with
CSR.
In general, when the empirical literature assesses the links between CSP and
CFP the conclusion is that the evidence is not very clear. We think that this
results from analyzing all the studies at the same time, that is the bottom line
in Table 5. However, when we distinguish between the diﬀerent performance
indicators, matters are put in a completely diﬀerent light and we ﬁnd that
there indeed are very clear associations between ﬁnance and CSR. Note that
in Table 5 we interpret the ﬁndings of event studies in what we feel is the
appropriate way, as discussed in the previous section. Table 5 shows that the
paradoxical empirical ﬁndings are in line with our propositions and that these
ﬁndings should in fact be interpreted as showing very strong evidence on the
relation between CSR and ﬁnancial performance. This raises two issues; What
are the key drivers of our model and are the underlying assumptions realistic?
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Studies using stock market returns
Authors Relationship Strength of result
Freedman and Stagliano (1991) Positive Strong/Moderate
McGuire et al. (1988) Positive Moderate
Ingram (1978) Positive Moderate
Brown (1998) Positive Moderate
Vance (1975) Negative Strong
Newgren et al. (1985) Negative Moderate
Guerard (1997a) Mixed Moderate
Davidson and Worrell (1992) Mixed Weak
Brown (1997) No eﬀect/Positive Weak
Hamilton et al. (1993) No eﬀect Moderate
Alexander and Buchholz (1978) No eﬀect Weak
Guerard (1997b) No eﬀect N/A
Chen and Metcalf (1980) No eﬀect Weak
Event Studies
Authors Relationship Strength of result
Blacconiere and Northcut (1997) Positive Moderate
Blacconiere and Patten (1994) Positive Moderate
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) Positive Moderate
Shane and Spicer (1983) Positive Moderate
Stevens (1984) Positive Moderate
Posnikoﬀ (1997) Positive* Moderate
Belkaoui Positive Weak
Meznar Nigh and Kwok (1994) Negative* Strong
Wright and Ferris (1997) Negative* Moderate
Boyle Higgings and Rhee (1979) Negative Moderate
Diltz (1995) Mixed Weak
Freedman and Jaggi (1986) No eﬀect Moderate
Patten (1990) No eﬀect Weak
Pava and Krausz (1995) No eﬀect Weak
Studies using stock market returns ﬁnd an ambiguous relation between Corporate
Social Performance and Corporate Financial Performance.
*These are studies on the eﬀect of announcing withdrawal from South-Africa, with
conﬂicting results.
There are two key drivers of our model. The ﬁrst is the assumption that
investors prefer to hold ﬁrms in their investment portfolio that generate less
social damage. This is a trivial assumption, but nonetheless an important one.
Obviously, the mere existence of green funds and socially responsible screening
justiﬁes this assumption. More importantly, assuming that social damage is
proportional to capital labor ratios, or capital intensity (k), is the second main
driver of the results. The relationship does not have to be linear, but social
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Overview of empirical ﬁndings
Number of Positive Negative Mixed No
Financial performance indicator studies relation relation relation relation
Market-to-Book 4 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %)
Return on Assets 36 27 (75%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9 (25%)
stock market returns* 27 7 (26%) 9 (33%) 3 (11%) 8 (30%)
Total 67 38 (57%) 9 (13%) 3 (5%) 17 (25%)
Overview of the results of the studies on the relation between Corporate Social
Performance and Corporate Financial Performance, classiﬁed by ﬁnancial
performance measure.
*We give an interpretation to the results of event studies that is in line with our
model.
damage has to be increasing in capital intensity.
If social damage is interpreted as environmental damage it is not unrealistic
to assume that real capital is an important source of pollution. For example,
King and Lenox (2001), introduce a variable “size” which is deﬁned as the log
of assets 9 and ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive correlations of this size variable with
total emissions and relative emissions. Liang (2005) also ﬁnds evidence that
increased capital intensity is related to increased pollution levels. Generally, it
is accepted that capital used in production causes a threat to the environment.
If social damage is interpreted as damage toward employees of the ﬁrm, it is
not directly clear why capital intensity should aﬀect this. Nonetheless, there is
some empirical evidence that supports this claim (see, for example, Becchetti
et al., 2006). Comparing a higher capital-labor ratio to the capital-labor re-
sulting from proﬁt maximizing behavior within one industry implies that a
socially responsible ﬁrm will pay higher wages to its workers relative to the
workers’ productivity. So, either more men are put on the job to do the same
tasks, or equivalently, they are paid more compared to the industry wage.
More men on the job can improve health and safety conditions. A higher wage
can be interpreted as a ‘fair’ wage, instead of exploiting cheap labor.
In this respect, another line of reasoning is the following. Although we have
9 They also introduce a variable called “capital intensity” and deﬁne it as capital
expenditures over sales, which is diﬀerent from the more standard ratio total capital
over sales.
31not modeled a labor market, we can relate social responsibility of a ﬁrm to
the theory of compensating wage diﬀerentials (See, for example, Rosen, 1974).
This theory basically says that if two ﬁrms oﬀer identical jobs in terms of
productivity, but one ﬁrm has poor health and safety regulations, poor work
environment, higher risks, etc..., then this ﬁrm has to pay a relatively higher
wage in equilibrium to attract workers. The other ﬁrm, therefore, hires rela-
tively more labor in equilibrium due to the lower wage. This lowers the capital
labor ratio of socially responsible ﬁrms. So we do not make explicit how the
socially responsible company “sets” the capital labor ratio in this case, since
it depends on labor supply, but it somehow makes decisions resulting in a
higher capital-labor ratio through equilibrium in the labor market. This then
results in a higher return on assets, since the marginal product of capital is
increased. 10
Both interpretations of social damage can be related to the capital-labor ratio
theoretically and there is also some empirical evidence in favor of these claims.
Unfortunately, not all empirical studies report on the correlation between the
capital-labor ratio and the measure of social performance and where this is
reported, it is often done on an aggregate level instead of analyzing it at the
industry level, which is especially important for the interpretation of social
performance in terms of ﬁrm-employee relationships. Nevertheless, since most
empirical studies are in line with our theoretical propositions, it gives indirect
support for the assumed relationship between social damage and the capital-
labor ratio.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a neo-classical framework to study the eﬀects of
corporate social responsibility on ﬁnancial performance. We analyze the im-
pact of socially responsible behavior on three widely used ﬁnancial indicators
in a general equilibrium stock market model, namely the Market-to-Book ra-
10 Note that the compensating wage diﬀerential explanation would imply an opera-
tional proﬁt.
32tio, Return on Assets and stock market returns. To our knowledge, using a
general equilibrium approach has not been done in the existing literature on
corporate social responsibility.
We assume that a signiﬁcant part of investor behavior is aﬀected by non-
ﬁnancial characteristics of the ﬁrm. In addition, we assume that the ﬁrm has
considerable control over these characteristics. We show that in such a setting
corporate social responsible behavior does not have an unambiguous eﬀect on
ﬁnancial performance when one gives a uniform interpretation to the diﬀerent
ﬁnancial indicators. More speciﬁcally, we show that for Market-to-Book we
expect a positive relation with social performance, for ROA also a positive
relation with social performance, and for stock market returns this relation is
ambiguous at the aggregate level and negative at the industry level. Given that
two ﬁrms generate the same returns, investors prefer the ﬁrm that generates
less social costs. So the ﬁrst eﬀect of CSR on ﬁnancial performance is that in
equilibrium there must be a trade-oﬀ between higher returns and lower social
costs, i.e. socially responsible investors require a lower cost of capital from so-
cially responsible ﬁrms. Related to this result is that socially responsible ﬁrms
will exhibit a higher Market-to-Book ratio. Furthermore, ﬁrms can either take
the importance of non-market costs into account, i.e. behave socially responsi-
ble, or simply maximize pure proﬁts. A ﬁrm that takes non-market costs into
account, subjects itself to a higher cost of capital. Consequently, the second ef-
fect of CSR on ﬁnancial performance is that we observe higher operating proﬁt
measures for socially responsible ﬁrms. The two opposing eﬀects generate an
ambiguous eﬀect of CSR on stock market returns at the aggregate level, due
to the fact that industries diﬀer with respect to the amount of social costs per
output and that the choice of whether or not to behave socially responsible is
independent of the industry the ﬁrm is in. These eﬀects of CSR on ﬁnancial
performance must hold in equilibrium, irrespective of whether there are direct
or indirect beneﬁts of behaving socially responsible, such as eco-eﬃciency,
improved brand equity, improved customer relationships, etc... Therefore, we
stress that our results are not due to assumptions on the operational level of
the ﬁrm, but simply an artifact of market clearing.
33We present the existing literature of the past three decades on the relation
between corporate social performance and corporate ﬁnancial performance in
light of our ﬁndings and show that they are in line with our propositions.
Our overview clariﬁes that in fact it are not the empirical results that have
been conﬂicting, but the interpretations of these results. Our ﬁndings imply
that what has been labeled as mixed evidence, is in fact strong evidence of a
correlation between CSR and various ﬁnancial indicators.
Our analysis opens up various areas for further research. First, our model pro-
vides more speciﬁc and theoretically founded testable hypotheses for empirical
work. Furthermore, our model cannot provide an understanding of why some
ﬁrms choose to behave socially responsible and others not, as this choice is
exogenous to the model. Moreover, in a static model it is not possible to an-
alyze the long term considerations of ﬁrm behavior that are often associated
with corporate social responsibility. These issues, among others, can be an-
swered when we extend the simple static model or engage in empirical work
that considers our propositions.
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